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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

EARL W. SADLEIR,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No.

-vs.-

8374

jfELVIN G. KNAPTON,
Defendant and Appellant.

Respondent's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Inasmuch as the defendant claims that the evidence
is insufficient to warrant the verdict of the jury, we deem
it desirable to enlarge upon the statement of facts contained in Appellant's brief by summarizing plaintiff's
evidence.
In describing the relationship between himself and
the defendant, the plaintiff testified that the defendant
was as close as anybody could be. "He was my buddy".
(R. 13). During all their naval career, they were together
1
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on every assignment and even had the same rating. Practically all of their liberty and off-duty time was spent
together and considerable of their on-duty time was
sp~nt together CR. 14). ·Over a period of years following
their discharge from the Navy, they perpetuated their
friendship (R. 10-11).
The plaintiff loved his wife at the time the divorce
was obtained, and w.an,ted the family relationship to
continue. He hoped that she would come back even if she
got the .divorce (R. 31). She had her mind made up and
the defendant influenced it that way (R. 32). She is no\v
married to defendant, Kn-apton, (R.·11); Plaintiff misses
his children very much (R. 34). Plaintiff and his former
wife arranged their lives around the children most of
the time. He had no interests outside of his home in the
form of club me~berships · or entertainments or things
of that kind. He and his wife had never quarreled and
prior to the separation she had never complained to him
of anything that dissatisfied her with the marriage (R.
35).
A neighbo1', M·rs. Fred W. Arbogast, lived next door

t~ the Sadleirs between 1947 and November of 1953. She
first saw the defendant, Knapton, at the plaintiff's wedding whete he was. an usher. She observed that th~
defendant was a very frequent visitor at plaintiff's home,
and that .he called more than two or three times a week
{R. 51). Heoften cam~.before dark and left very late in
the night .. She also observed that the defendant ate meals
at the plaintiff!·s .home many times. During 1953, de2
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fendant would call four or five times a week at plaintiff's
home. Commencing at about November, 1953, there were
numerous instances in which defendant would have his
arms around plaintiff's wife. She saw defendant a number of times fondling plaintiff's wife and nestling up to
her (R. 54). She made no effort to observe these things.
The incidents were just thrust upon her view. Many
times she went next door to the plaintiff's house after
her child, and on many occasions the defendant was there
and the plaintiff was not. On some of the occasions she
found the doors locked and the blinds drawn (R. 55).
The blinds were very often drawn during the period of
several months prior to November, 1953 (R. 56).
The witness observed that the defendant had meals
at the plaintiff's home on practically every visit. She
could see them through the window of her house (R. 57).
Plaintiff's mother testified that she lived just across
the corner from plaintiff's home (R. 59). She knew that
the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant was
very close. She first objected in May of 1953, to the visits
defendant made upon the plaintiff's wife. Prior to that,
she was aware of the frequency of defendant's visits at
her son's home (R. 60). Defendant would call right after
5:00 o'clock p.m. and plaintiff's wife would fix him
supper. Plaintiff had gone to work at 3:00 o'clock p.m.
(R. 61). In the latter part of May, 1953, she told defendant that he was causing trouble by coming so often when
plaintiff was not at home; that she didn't want to cause
trouble between the plaintiff and defendant; that she
3
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would appreciate it if defendant would stop coming when
plaintiff was not at home. She said, "At that time I had
a lot of respect for Mel, (defendant), and I didn't want
to.hurt him, nor Vera, nor Earl, and I felt terrible about
it, and so, they were going on this canyon trip, and I said
to him, we won't say anything to Vera and Earl and you
go on the canyon trip and have a good time. When you
some back you just gradually stop coming only when Earl
is home." (R. 63). Thereafter, plaintiff's wife told him
in Knapton's presence that plaintiff's mother had ordered Knapton out of plaintiff's house (R. 24). Plaintiff
befriended Knapton and rebuked his mother (R. 25 ).
After they returned from the canyon trip, the plaintiff's
mother observed that defendant was at plaintiff's home
every night when plaintiff was not at home (R. 63).
After the two conversations involving defendant which
occurred in May, 1953, plaintiff's mother had no further
conversations with the defendant prior to the separation
which occurred in January, 1954. Plaintiff's wife had
never complained to his mother about her interferring
in their affairs (R. 67). There were never any harsh
words between plaintiff's mother and his wife. Plaintiff's wife was always sweet to his mother. When
plaintiff's mother heard his wife testify in court, that
was the first time she ever knew that she had hurt Vera
in any way (R. 68).
Another next door neighbor named Ida Oakley testified that from the marriage of the plaintiff and his wife,
which occurred in 1947, until the separation they appeared :to be a very fine couple, very mueh in love, hand
4
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in hand all the time. She observed that plaintiff loved
his children because he was constantly with them and
tended them and did what he could to help (R. 73). During 1952-53, defendant came four or five times a week
to plaintiff's home. He would come around 5:00 o'clock
p.m. and stay very late. Several times the witness
observed defendant in the swing at night on the porch
at plaintiff's home with plaintiff's wife. In April, 1952,
the witness saw the defendant "love all over her (plaintiff's wife), ... putting his head on her chest and having
his arms around her, and when she was ironing she
would have to crawl back under his arm to go get a piece
of material to bring back to iron, and she wouldn't be
no more than back to her ironing board than he would
have his arm around her again." This conduct continued
on through 1952, 1953. The witness never spoke to
plaintiff about it (R. 36), nor to plaintiff's wife (R. 77).
She talked to plaintiff's mother about it in May, 1953
(R. 78).
Cleo Torgorsen, another neighbor, testified that she
lived in that neighborhood for eight years (R. 80). That
she used to see plaintiff's wife ironing in the living room
and dining room in plaintiff's home when defendant
would walk up and kiss her, and put his arms around
her all the time (R. 85). The defendant called at plaintiff's home during 1952, 1953 every night. He came from
work and left ten minutes or five minutes before plaintiff
would come home. Plaintiff would come home about a
quarter to midnight. She also testified concerning the
front-porch incidents during the two-year period (R. 85).

5
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During the last six or eight months, the defendant and
plaintiff's wife would draw the blinds down and turn
the lights down low (R. 86). Many times she saw the
defendant and plaintiff's wife leave the plaintiff's home
together· (R. 87-88). They would return just before
plaintiff would be back from work. During the two-year
period, 1952-1953, defendant and plaintiff's wife would
go out on an average of about three times a week (R. 8788). The witness never called these things to the attention of plaintiff ( R. 89).
Exhibit '' 4'' is a collection of phonograph records
,\rhich defendant brought to plaintiff's home, hav.ing such
titles as "I Want to Play House With You" and "I Am
Walking Behind You.''
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO DIRECT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE
DEFENDANT.
(a)

BY REASON OF SECTION 30-3-9, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953.

(b)

BY REASON OF THE CLAIMED INSUFFI~
CIENCY OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE.

2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
(a)

IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER
THE STATE OF PLAINTIFF'S FEELINGS
AS AFFECTING THE CHILDREN.

(b)

IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER
. PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
6
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3. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDAXT'S :MO'riON FOR A NEW TRIAL.

't11

ARGUMENT
1. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO DIRECT ~\ VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE
DEFI 1~N"DANT.

U;.

1tt1r

; 01~
~u~n

Llm

(a)

BY REASON OF SECTION 30-3-9, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953.

It is true that the above statute provides that the
guilty party in a divorce action forfeits all rights acquired by the marriage. The right to sue an interloper
for his tortious conduct in alienating the affections of
the wife is not a right acquired by the marriage. This is
clearly shown in the case of DeFord vs. Johnson, 251 Mo.
244, 158 S.W. 29,46 L.R.A. New Series, 1003, from which
we quote as follows :

,n'J

JER

''The right to sue is one which must arise
'vhile the marital relationship exists, but it is not
a right which grows out of the marital relationship, and is not one of the forfeited rights mentioned in the statute. The rights and claims
referred to in this statute are rights and claims
between husband and wife which spring up by
reason of the marriage, and the statute has no
reference whatever to the tortious act of a third
party during the existence of the marriage relationship, which tortious act gives the husband a
cause of action as against such third party. To
present an abc case, if a railway cripple and
injure the wife of A, so that he is deprived of her
society and aid, is the right of action a right and
claim under and by virtue of the marriage? We

7
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think not. ~either is the cause of action stated in
this petition such a claim or right.''
On rehearing the court reiterated the same principle
as defendant has set forth on page 9 of his brief. The
~fissouri court (577 S.W.) says that the statute:
"clearly refers, in apt words, to rights and claims
which the marriage gives him, and not to thosewhich come from a violation of his marriage
rights; to rights and claims which effect the interests of his wife, and not to those which exist
only between himself and strangers.''
A wife decreed to be guilty in a divorce action would
forfeit the right she acquired by the marriage to the
support of her husband. However, the statute was not
intended to benefit a third party tort feasor by relieving
him of the consequences of his intentional and malicious
wrong committed against the plaintiff, while the plaintiff
enjoyed and had a right to enjoy the love and affection
of his wife. It is purely a matter of chronology. Certainly the guilty party in a divorce action could not
maintain an action for alienation of affection if the
wrongs constituting the alienation were committed subsequent to the divorce after the right to the affection
of the wife was forfeited. Prior to the divorce, the plaintiff enjoyed all the rights and privileges of a husband,
and prior to the treacherous intrusion of the defendant
he enjoyed the love and affection of his wife. The right
of action for the alienation of that love and affection
could be extinguished only by payment of a consideration, supporting a release and satisfaction of a claim,

8
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or by the lapse of time prescribed by the appropriate
statute of limitation.
Since the DeFord vs. Johnson case, the Missouri
Court has again upheld the right of the guilty party in
a divorce action to sue for the alienation of affections.
See Pollard vs. Ward, (Mo.), 233 S.W. 14, 20 A.L.R. 936.
The case contains an excellent discussion on the general
rule that a decree of divorce does not bar an action for
previous alienation of affection. We also commend to
the attention of the court the annotation on the subject,
commencing at page 943 of 20 A.L.R.
Counsel for the defendant at the trial and on this
appeal has made much of the fact that the plaintiff did
not oppose the divorce and thus became the guilty party
at the proceedings; that the plaintiff ''sat mute and permitted the court to act on his wife's testimony". Human
pride is such that it often caus~s a person grievously
wronged to permit a wife who has withdrawn her affections to obtain a divorce without contest. This is within
the experience of all lawyers and judges. The defendant,
Knapton, and his new wife, the former Mrs. Sadlier,
were present in court throughout this trial and heard
the narration of the repeated acts of treachery of the
defendant, extending over a. period of years, yet neither
took the stand to refuse or to explain. They heard the
plaintiff testify that his wife had been influenced by the
defendant to leave plaintiff (R. 32); that plaintiff and
his wife never quarreled prior to the separation; that
she had never complained to him of anything that dissatisfied her with the marriage; that plaintiff's mother
9
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(whose interference ·with the domestic affairs of the
plaintiff and his former wife was complained of by the
wife in the divorce proceedings) talked to the defendant
oi1ly !\vice about his numerous visits to the Sadleir home,
and then in the ftiendliest of terms. This the defei1dant
did not s:ee fit. to deny. The defendant, l{napton, also
heard the plaintiff testify that he, l{napton, promised
to withdraw and to advise plaintiff's wife to remain with
the phtintiff to keep plaintiff's home intact, and that on
t~1e occasion set apart for this purpose the defendant
treacherously broke his promise, made avowals of love
and offered to support the plaintiff's wife and pay for
th~ cost of the divorce proceedings, if she would leave
the plaintiff. The defendant sat mute in court and did
not see fit to deny_ these facts, and he now seeks the shelter ofa law ":'hich was not intended to benefit him at all,
a:Jaw which was. intended to. terminate rights existing
between a man and his wife, not to cleanse the soiled
ha~ds of a wrongdoer.
Again counsel for defendant urges that public policy
requires that a guilty third party be exonerated from
~he consequences of his wrongful acts by the same statute
that provides for the forfeiture of marital rights of a
guilty party in a divorce action. This is a strange doctrine which flies in the face of the long-established public
policy of preserving the sanctity of the marriage relationship and of punishing those who intentionally and
maliciously seek to drive a wedge between a man and his
wife. This policy goes all the way back to the Tenth
Collliilandment in the 20th Chapter of Exodus and finds

10
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voi<:e in aU of our criminal and civil laws pertaining to
wrongs committed against the marriage relationship.
How can the public interest ever be preserved by sheltering and protecting him who covets another man's wife~
Counsel for the defendant states that the causal
connection between the defendant's conduct and the loss
of Vera's affection for the plaintiff is completely dissipated by the divorce decree itself, and the adjudication
thereby that the plaintiff herein was the guilty party.
The great weight of authority is contrary to this view
of the defendant. See Nevins t·. Nevins, 68 Kan. 410, 7G
P. 492, in which it was claimed that the plaintiff's own
acts constituted or contributed to the alienation of the
affections. The court held:
''In such an action, if the acts done and influences used by the defendant were the controlling cause of the separation, the plaintiff may
recover from the defendant, although other causes
may have contributed in some degree to the
result.''
See also Hope
which holds:

t'.

Twarling, (Neb.), 198 N.W. 161,

'' ... In an action for the alienation of a husband's affection, a prior decree of divorce may be
admitted in evidence to prove marriage and the
se,·ering of the conjugal relationship, but it is
not a former adjudication with respect to the
subsequent cause of action, and it does not operate
as an estoppel by judgment.
"Defendant in the present action wa~ not a
party to the former suit of divorce and is not
entitled to any of the fruits of that litigation."
11
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To the same effect is Grirtz
2d 481, and 42 C.J.S. 323.

l'.

Leiser, (Colo.), 58 P.

This court in Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267
P. 2d 59, disposed of the contention that the husband in
that case had already lost the affections of his wife by
saying, as could be said here:
"A full answer to this is found in the fact that
the evidence was conflicting on these matters.''
We feel that the trial court erred against the plaintiff in accepting in evidence the findings of fact and
decree in the divorce action without limiting the jury's
consideration thereof (R. 48) and in instructing the jury
that the findings and decree were conclusive evidence of
the facts therein found, notwithstanding the testimony
of the plaintiff which was contrary to the evidence presented in the divorce proceeding. The matters found
and considered in the divorce proceedings were res
judicata against the world only to the extent of judicially
establishing the prior existence of the marriage and its
dissolution and the status of the parties thereafter under
the decree. To that extent only is the divorce judgment
a judgment in rem and res judicata in this action. See
Luick v. Arends, 21 N.D. 614, 132 N.W. 353; Prettyman
v. Williamson, (Del.), 39 Atl. 731; Hostetter v. Green,
(Ky.), 167 S.W. 919.
...
It was held in Luke v. Hill, 137 Ga. 159, 38 L.R.A.
N.S. 559, 73 S.E. 345, that a spouse who is suing and
against whom a divorce has been granted is not estopped
from contesting, in an action against a stranger, to that
12
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i~ P.

!, ~~:

~~.

decree, the truth of the grounds on which the decree was
prayed.
In the case of Sickler v. Marnnix, 68 Neb. 21, 93 N.vV.
1018, the wife brought an action for the alienation of
affection after the husband had been granted a divorce
on the ground of extreme cruelty. The court refused to
admit the decree in evidence saying:

,,

mon:

:w
loun~

"Mrs. Sickler (the defendant) was not a party
to that suit, and it is only where a judicial record
contains an admission of one or the other of the
parties to it that it is admissible as such in favor
of a stranger.... ~Irs. Mannix (the plaintiff) did
not admit in her pleadings in the divorce case that
she had been guilty of extreme cruelty to her husband. On the contrary she denied and contested
the judgment, and the fact that the court found
against her on the trial does not make such finding
admissible against her in favor of a stranger, on
the trial of another action.''

It is true that the plaintiff as the defendant in the
divorce action did not answer or defend, but his default
would not constitute an admission of the charge of the
complaint. It simply indicated that he was not going to
contest it. Our statute, Section 30-3-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, requires that no decree of divorce shall be
granted upon default or otherwise, except upon legal
evidence taken in the cause. In this connection, we desire
to refer the court to the case of Thomas v. Thomas, (Mo.),
186 S.W. 993, from which we quote as follows:
" ... By statute in nearly all the states, including Missouri and Tennessee, defendant's
failure to answer does not warrant a decree, but
13
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the proof of the cause of action must be made. In
those states having no statute like ours, the rult>
is nevertheless the same. The courts have, in fact,
treated the common law as including the applicable canonical rule, that an express admission
does not, of itself, justify a decree. 3 Wigmore
on Evidence, Section 2067. In view of this, it is
not correct to treat a default in a divorre suit
as an admission of the allegations of the petition
which may be put in evidence by a stranger in
another action against the divorced defendant. A
defendant in a divorce proceeding omitting to
answer must be held to know, that even in the
divorce case his silence does not constitute an
admission of the allegations of the petition, which
the plaintiff can rely upon for any purpose in
obtaining the decree. How then can it be said
that an act or omission which implies no admission in the case in which it is done is available
as an implied admission in a subsequent action
by a stranger to the divorce proceeding~ We
think there is no ground upon "\vhich such a doctrine can be supported . . . ''
"It follows from the conclusions stated that
the failure to answer constituted no admission
available to a stranger in another action, that
such failure had no tendency to contradict Green
B. Thomas's testimony, even if a proper foundation had been laid. No information was laid in
fact. It is true also, of this, that there was no
element of estoppel in failure to answer in the
divorce case.''
Plaintiff, therefore, had the right in this action
against Knapton to establish facts contrary to the testimony given by his wife at previous divorce proceedings,
and there was nothing in the testimony of Mrs. Knapton

14
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that could be used as an admission against the plaintiff
herein. Counsel for the defendant did not see fit to avail
himself of l\irs. Knapton's testimony in this action, although she was present throughout the trial, but was
contented to rely entirely upon the findings and decree
in the divorce matter.

(b)

BY REASON OF THE CLAIMED INSUFFICU~NCY OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE.

It requires only a perusal of the summary of facts
set forth in this brief, together with those referred to in
defendant's brief, to dispose· of defendant's contention
that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict.
The defendant carried on a long, persistent campaign
to obtain for himselfthe affections of the plaintiff's wife.
Prior to his conduct which finally resulted in the alienation of Mrs. Sadleir 's affections, the plaintiff and his
wife enjoyed a pleasant and happy marriage. According
to the testimony of the plaintiff and the people who lived
around his home their marriage was an ideal one, free
from many of the disturbances and difficulties that sometimes attend other marriage situations. The fact that the
plaintiff's wife finally left him and married the defendant
is a sufficient proof of the accomplishment and fruition
of defendant's design to deprive the plaintiff of his wife's
love and affection.

:ction

tesn·

in~l
pton

Counsel for the defendant recklessly states that
there is no testimony in the case showing that the cause
of the loss of Vera's affection was other than as reflected
in the divorce pro~eedings. Of course, the plaintiff

15
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refuted all the matters testified to in the diyorce proceedings relative to his misconduct. Furthermore, in the
conference between the plaintiff, the defendant, and Vera
which took place in the Sadleir home on or about the
8th or 9th day of January, 1954, the plaintiff testified as
follows:
'' Q:

What was actually said'

''A: Said that he loved her and wanted to
marry her, and that if she would leave me that
he would support them and so forth-support her
through the time it takes to get a divorce decree
until it is final; he would pay for the divorce and
everything. That was mainly what was said and
- I don't know-he just agreed with her. vVhatever she wanted, that was it. He was going tohe wanted her and that was the way he was going
to get her, (R. 29)."
Thereafter, the plaintiff's wife left him and they
never lived together again. The divorce action was soon
filed and a decree obtained on February 26, 1954, (Exhibit 1-D), and Vera married the defendant.
2. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.
(a)

IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER
THE STATE OF PLAINTIFF'S FEELINGS
AS AFFECTING THE CHILDREN.

Thoughtful study of instruction No. 13 (R. 127)
given by the trial court does not disclose a basis for the
objection made by the defendant. The jury was not told,
as counsel asserts, that the plaintiff could recover for the
loss of the society of his children, although we do not
16
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concede that such loss may not be included in the con~
sicleration of damages. The Oldroyd case in discussing
elements of damage in this type of case used the
language:
''The jury were properly advised of the elements that could be considered in assessing the
damages. They were entitled to accept the version
of the plaintiff and his witnesses that the defendant wilfully and wrongfully alienated away
the affections of ~Irs. Wilson, who was a capable,
industrious and attractive woman, and who theretofore had been a loving and devoted wife and
mother with whom plaintiff was rearing his children in a happy home."
This language aptly fits the eYidence in this case and
the form of the instruction given by the trial court.

(b)

f£x.

~-

IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER
PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

:Malice was clearly shown by the evidence in this
case. As a matter of fact, the word "malice" is hardly
a strong enough term with which to appropriately characterize the proceedings of the defendant who walked
through the open door of his best friend's home and
while in the full enjoyment of the plaintiff's hospitality,
friendship and trust, looked upon his best friend's wife
with lustful and covetous eyes, and formulated the. treacherous and evil design of stealing her away from the
plaintiff. It was not a single act of thoughtlessness or
impetuosity. It was a campaign extending through the
years. Night after night, the defendant called at plaintiff's home, always just before meal time, -always. after
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he knew plaintiff was at his regular work. He sat in the
midst of plaintiff's family and supped at plaintiff's table
night after night throughout the years, remaining as
long as possible, leaving only minutes before he knew
the plaintiff was to return, spending the evening making
intimate and improper advances upon plaintiff's wife.
Then he would sneak away with the resolve to return
again the following day to commit the same wrongs.
The court was fully authorized in permitting the
jury to consider punitive damages. In the case of lYilson
v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 P. 2d 759, this court quoted
with approval from the Missouri case of Butterfield v.
Ennis, 193 Missouri Appeals 638, 186 S.W. 1173, as
follows:
"The enticing away of another man's wife is
an act inherently wrong and necessarily known to
be wrong and if the alienation from the husband
is intentionally done, the law implies malice from
these facts."
This court then said :
"We conclude that the jury could reasonably
believe that in continuing to make love to Mrs.
Wilson after being warned to desist, the defendant did so wilfully and with such wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights that an award of
punitive damages was justified.''
In the case at bar, Knapton was like "one of the
family", as counsel for the defendant aptly concludes,
and while he enjoyed the hospitality of the Sadleir home
and complete confidence and trust of the plaintiff, he
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formulated and rarried into effect almost nightly a
treacherous plan to usurp plaintiff's rightful possession
in the affections of his wife. It is difficult for my mind
to conceive of a situation more pregnant with malice
and with guilty design and intent, with reckless disregard
for all the common decencies, than the conduct of the
defendant disclosed by the evidence in this record. As
though this were not enough, defendant's malice was
emphasized by his reaction to the kindly suggestion of
plaintiff's mother that he stop calling at plaintiff's home
when plaintiff was at work berause the neighbors were
talking. The mother in her kindness told the defendant
not to mention the fact that she had talked to him to the
plaintiff, or to plaintiff's wife, and indicated that everything would be fine if he would limit his visits. She had
said to him, ''we won't say anything to Vera and Earl.
You go on the canyon trip (with them) and have a good
time. When you come back you just gradually stop
coming and everything will be all right.'' The defendant,
seemingly treacherous by nature, responded to this kindness h~, falsely reporting immediately to plaintiff and
to plaintiff's wife that plaintiff's mother had ordered
him out of the house, and then after he had satisfied the
plaintiff of the genuineness of his friendship he increased
his visits to the Sadleir home, loeked the door, drew the
blinds and turned down the lights, so that he could continue making love to plaintiff's wife to the tune of the
record, ''I Want to Play House With You''. Hav:ing
succeeded in driving the wedge between the plaintiff and
his wife and in accomplishing the transfer Gf her affections from their rightful possessor to him, under the
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circumstances disclosed by this record, he has the temerity, through the mouth of eloquent counsel, to vouchsafe
innocence and friendship throughout his proceedings,
and seeks to delude this court with the representation
that his conduct was free from criticism or blame. When
the realization was finally brought home to the plaintiff
that defendant had succeeded in stealing the affections
of his wife, plaintiff asked defendant to leave his wife
alone and asked him if he would come down and tell
plaintiff's wife that he, Knapton, didn't love her, and
th~t he would withdraw. To this Knapton agreed further
stating that he would back the plaintiff up in an attempt
to convince plaintiff's wife to remain in her own home
with the plaintiff (R. 28). The following day Knapton
went to the plaintiff's home and again demonstrated hi's
treachery by telling plaintiff's wife that he loved her
and wanted to marry her and that if she would leave
plaintiff he would support her and the children and would
pay for the divorce and everything (R. 29). We submit
that the evidence, unchallenged and unexplained by the
defendant, compelled a finding of malice by the jury.

3. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
The conclusion that the court did not err in denying
defendant's motion for a new trial necessarily follows
the matters heretofore considered in this brief. The
amount of the verdict and of the punitive damages was
not excessive and did not reflect passion or prejudice on
the part of the jury. The trial court was most liberal to
the defendant. The defendant requested six instructions,
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all of which were given by the trial court. The court
told the jury in instruction No. 15 that the findings and
decree in the divorce action were conclusive aR to the
facts therein found (R. 129). In its instruction No. 10
(R. 124), the trial court instructed the jury that in order
to find for the plaintiff, apart from the consideration of
punitive damages, they would have to believe that the
defendant's acts were not only intentional but malicious.
Plaintiff excepted to this in~truction ( R. 105). We do
not urge these matters at this time, having prevailed
in the court below, but we mention them only for the
purpose of showing that defendant's theory was more
than adequately presented to the jury in the court's instructions.
(jOXCLUSION
However distasteful a proceeding for alienation of
affection may be to the guilty defendant, it is in the
public interest that the marriage institution be strengthened and respected, and that those who seek to undermine and destroy it be punished for their wrongs. There
were many unattached women in the world who could
have been legitimate objects of the defendant's pursuit.
His conduct in destroying the happy home of his best
friend to satisfy his own covetousness was indefensible.
The evidence, as disclosed by this record, fully supports
the verdict of the jury and we earnestly submit that the
judgment appealed from should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WOODROW D. WHITE,
Attorney for Respondent
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